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For a number of years the University of Michigan Personality 
and Language Behavior Research Group has been actively investi- 
gating relations between second language behavior and various 
cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions of personality. We welcome 
therefore the publication of a critical examination of a method 
frequently employed in studying language proficiency and affective 
variables: cross-sectional, two-variable, correlation studies (Oller 
and Perkins 1978 and their references). We especially want to 
record agreement with a number of points made by Oller and 
Perkins. 
First, simple correlations between two measures cannot be 
taken as proof of a causal relationship between underlying psycho- 
logical variables which the measures are designed to test. If scores 
yielded by two measures X and Y are correlated, one does not 
know whether variance in the underlying variable x produces 
variance in the underlying variable y or whether y produces x, or, 
for #at matter, whether z is the cause of both, or indeed whether 
the correlation is better explained by some other, more complex, 
causal relationship. We do not intend to argue that one or another 
of the possible hypotheses about causal relations between language 
proficiency and attitude is the correct one. There are two reasons: 
as stated, correlational data alone are by their nature incapable of 
proving causal relationships; and theories are in general indeter- 
minate on empirical grounds. Choices among competing theories or 
hypotheses are, therefore, more likely made on the basis of 
elegance, parsimony and other theoretic-methodological grounds. 
Second, establishing relationships among psychological vari- 
*Editor's note: this response was received just as this issue was going to 
press. John Oller and Kyle Perkins will be invited to respond to this reply if 
they wish, in the next issue. 
lThe authors are members of the University of Michigan Personality and 
Language Behavior Research Group. 
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ables depends upon the validity of the instruments which are used 
to measure them. Approval motivation, self-flattery and response 
set may influence a set of measures to such an extent that 
significant correlations are found among the measures, correlations 
which are independent of any relationships which might or might 
not exist among the underlying psychological variables. The 
validity of professed attitude measures is especially suspect because 
of the commingling of affective and cognitive operations in the 
measurement task. The Micro Momentary Expressions Test is 
another example of a suspect measure, and its authors actively 
discourage its use as a measure of individual differences in 
empathy.2 
Having established agreement that correlation is not equivalent 
to causation and correlations among invalid measures yield no 
important theoretical conclusions, this reply to Oller and Perkins 
has two further aims. We intend to examine the strength of Oller 
and Perkins’ arguments against the validity of self-report measures, 
and second, to evaluate whether any of the studies cited by Oller 
and Perkins provide plausible evidence for a causal relation 
between variance in affective variable‘s and variance in second 
language attainment (as distinct from correlations between 
measures), a relation independent of verbal intelligence, approval 
motivation, self-flattery and response set. 
Oller and Perkins employ two types of argument to cast 
doubt on the validity of so called self-report measures of affective 
variables. The first involves analogic reasoning from claims about 
the validity of self-report measures of a cognitive variable, language 
2The transposition which Guiora et al. (1967) refer to is not from 
button pushing to language learning, but from psychotherapy to language 
learning. It is hypothesized that strong parallels exist between trying to 
understand a patient in therapy and trying to understand a speaker of a 
language which one knows only slightly; that the first is conducive to 
successful therapy and the second for successful language learning. Success in 
therapeutic intervention is even less easy to measure than is success in second 
language attainment. If personality factors can be shown to contribute to 
successful language learning, these findings become suggestive of traits im- 
portant to therapists. 
The misunderstanding by Oller and Perkins has no bearing on questions 
of the MME test’s validity. However, because of the limited reliability or 
questionable validity of cognitively mediated tasks the Personality and Lan- 
guage Behavior Research Group has in recent years pursued two different lines 
of investigation: experimental studies (e.g., the effects of drugs on second 
language behavior, uiz. Guiora e t  al., 1972), and development of more direct 
measures of affect (e.g., Galvanic skin response, inhibition of response) in 
second language behavior. 
UPSHUR ET AL. 101 
proficiency. The second type of argument involves offering 
plausible explanations for correlations obtained with self-report 
measures, explanations which differ from those which would 
indicate construct validity of the measures. Arguments of both 
types, as employed by Oller and Perkins are flawed enough to 
seriously weaken them. These flaws will be taken up in turn. 
Oller and Perkins argue by analogy that the validity of 
self-ratings of affective variables are not apt to exceed the validity 
of self-ratings of language proficiency. Next they report a series of 
correlations between self-reports and tests of proficiency and 
report an upper-bound for validity of self-ratings at .69. Even if 
one is prepared to accept the analogy, the upper-bound is not 
supported. The claim about validity of self-rating of affect is a 
claim about the correlation between a rating and an underlying 
psychological variable. In this case the value which the psycho- 
logical variable takes is a true criterion. The reports about validity 
of proficiency self-ratings on the other hand are reports about 
correlations between two measures neither of which is perfectly 
reliable or valid. Thus the correlation which Oller and Perkins 
propose as an upper-bound is not a proper upper-bound for a 
correlation between a self-rating and a true criterion a t  all; it is 
attenuated by unreliability and invalidity of the proficiency test 
which is used as a criterion measure. For example, if the validity 
of Murakami’s dictation score as a test of speaking ability were .69 
(and this would be extremely high for a correlation between a test 
and a true criterion), then self-ratings of speaking ability could 
correlate 1.00 with a true criterion of speaking ability, and by 
Oller and Perkins’ analogic reasoning the proper upper-bound for 
validity of self-ratings of effect becomes not .69 or 50% of total 
variance, but 1.00 or 100% of total variance. 
No claims are made here that self-reports are perfectly valid. 
What is claimed, however, is that Oller and Perkins have not 
provided a reasonable upper-bound for validity of self-ratings of 
affect. Because one cannot provide such an upper-bound for 
self-ratings of proficiency short of 1.00 no upper-bound for any 
other self-ratings short of 1.00 can be analogically inferred. 
Oller and Perkins’ second line of attack on the validity of 
affective measures involves showing that three tsaits-other than 
those which a self-report instrument is designed to measure-may 
influence subjects’ reports of self-ratings. These are the approval 
motive, self-flattery and response set. As Oller and Perkins rightly 
point out these three traits may lead to spurious correlations 
among measures which claim to test different constructs if the 
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traits produce consistent, non-random variance across measures. 
That is, the approval motive, self-flattery and response set must 
(1) be differentially present in different subjects and (2) should 
affect total scores or ratings on the two measures to a comparable 
degree. The second condition can be met if either the traits are not 
independent and their total effect on two measures is comparable, 
or the traits are independent and their individual effects are 
comparable. These are rather exacting conditions to satisfy, but are 
not out of the question. The degree to which they are satisfied will 
determine the degree t o  which two attitude measures are 
spuriously correlated. Unfortunately Oller and Perkins did not 
point out this logical requirement of their argument, the premises 
(which may not be so readily accepted) that approval motive, 
self-flattery and response set are variable across subjects and 
comparably present in two measures for the measures to be 
spuriously correlated. 
I t  appears that Oller and Perkins may have overlooked this 
logical requirement. For example, they mention “institutionalizing” 
the approval motive in attitude measures. The most obvious effect 
of institutionalizing, it seems, is to do away with individual 
differences in approval motivation. The effect of this is, of course, 
to reduce extraneous non-random variance in the measures and, 
therefore, to reduce spurious correlations among measures which 
might otherwise be affected by subjects’ differential attempts to 
look good. In other words, approval motivation would have an 
increased main ef fec t  upon scores but would exert decreased 
within-su bjects influence upon scores. That is, average scores would 
be increased but variance would be decreased. 
Oller and Perkins cite two studies (with data summarized in 
Table 1) to  show the influence of self-flattery.3 The data showing 
a high relationship between self-ratings on various dimensions of 
personality and valuations of those dimensions are given only one 
interpretation by the authors although there is available a simple 
alternative which is at  least as plausible. Oller and Perkins suggest 
that subjects tend to rate themselves highly on characteristics 
which they value. The alternative is that subjects tend to value 
highly those characteristics which they possess and realize that 
they possess. Both interpretations are instances of self-flattery . The 
3Although Oller and Perkins erroneously average coefficients of correla- 
tion, a proper computation of the correlation among all rating-valuation 
correlations yields a marginally higher value. This is not however, important to 
their argument. 
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first, however, challenges the validity of self-ratings of personal 
characteristics while the second does not. What Oller and Perkins 
present as a clear argument with supporting data turns out, 
therefore, to be ambiguous at best. 
The data presented in Table 1 may also have some bearing on 
Oller and Perkins’ caveat that self-ratings may be highly con- 
taminated by response set. This warning is well taken, and response 
set may at times be an important source of variance in self-ratings. 
That it need not be so, however, is illustrated by the Table 3 data. 
Of the fifty-six correlations between self-ratings on one scale and 
valuations of a different scale, forty-nine failed to reach signifi- 
cance. Since self-ratings and valuations of iden tical scales correlated 
substan tially, if response set were very important then self-ratings 
and valuations of different scales should correlate significantly. But 
the number of correlations significant at p < .05 is only 7-1/2% 
greater than the number expected on the basis of chance alone. 
Although Oller and Perkins have failed to establish a proper 
upper-bound for the validity of self-report measures of attitude, 
and although their arguments in favor of spurious correlations 
among measures of proficiency and measures of affect seem to be 
flawed and therefore overstated, none the less the possibility still 
exists that obtained correlations do not reflect relations among 
underlying psychological states. Therefore the correlations obtained 
in the studies which Oller and Perkins cite must be interpreted 
with caution. The only study cited which does not rely 
predominantly upon correlational data is Savignon’s (1972) 
investigation of three “methods” of teaching French. Savignon 
employed a three group, quasi-experimental design in which the 
three groups differed with respect to the “laboratory component” 
of their first year French classes. One group, El, interacted in 
French with native speakers of French; a second group, E,, was 
provided with materials (films, etc.) designed to promote apprecia- 
tion of French culture; the third group participated in a standard 
audio lab. The results of a series of language tests and attitude and 
orientation measures were analyzed by analysis of variance. 
Most of Savignon’s findings about changes in reported 
attitudes may be explained away as Oller and Perkins have done.5 
She did, however, find a significant group x time interaction for 
integrative orientation. Group El, the learners whose laboratory 
5There is a serious problem with the “sorting out” explanation, 
however. The median correlation between verbal intelligence and five positive 
attitude measures administered at the end of the course to all groups is .01. 
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sessions required a degree of social integration with native French 
speakers, showed a decrease in integrative orientation over the first 
half of the course. The other groups showed slight but insignificant 
increases. This decrease is opposite to what one would expect of 
reasonalby intelligent students on the basis of approval motivation. 
The distribution of response set should not differ from group to 
group and so should not contribute to the interaction; if it  has any 
effect at  all it  should be to promote uniformity of scores over 
time-an effect opposite to that found for group El .  Self-flattery 
can account for this decrease in integrative orientation under the 
twin conditions that students (1) are able to  perceive their limited 
abilities to integrate into a contrived French speaking scoiety, and 
(2) express values to fit their perceptions of abilities rather than 
report abilities which fit the values they hold. I t  seems that in this 
case, therefore, one must admit a relation between a change in 
values and experience in language learning-or else one must 
conclude that the significant interaction is a rare, chance 
occurance. 
In conclusion, it seems that there is only limited evidence for 
a relation between affective states and second language attainment 
and that further and more convincing evidence is unlikely to be 
provided by simple corfelational studies. Further, it  seems that 
causal relationships among affect and proficiency will not be found 
to exist importantly in linear finite models such as those which are 
implied by Oller and Perkins’ figures 1-3. Hypotheses derived from 
feedback models may be more fruitful areas for investigation. We 
find it more plausible that both cognitive and noncognitive aspects 
of personality affect language attainment and also that language 
attainment affects personality. 
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